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This paper introduces systems of exchange values as tools for the organization of multi-agent systems. Systems of exchange values are deﬁned on the basis of the
theory of social exchanges, developed by Piaget and Homans. A model of social organization is proposed, where social relations are construed as social exchanges and
exchange values are put into use in the support of the continuity of the performance of social exchanges. The dynamics of social organizations is formulated in terms of
the regulation of exchanges of values, so that social equilibrium is connected to the continuity of the interactions. The concept of supervisor of social equilibrium is
introduced as a centralized mechanism for solving the problem of the equilibrium of the organization The equilibrium supervisor solves such problem making use of a
qualitative Markov Decision Process that uses numerical intervals for the representation of exchange values.




The exchange values approach to social interactions [31, 19], in which an interaction is seen as an exchange of services among a small group of agents, along with the
corresponding evaluation of (assignment of values to) such services, was conceived as a methodological stance where organizations are taken as collections of small
groups of agents.
Each such group is seen as having its own internal interaction dynamics, and the collection of all groups may be recursively construed as a collection of small groups of
small groups, etc., thus picturing the organization as a hierarchy of levels of structurally similar dynamical systems, all centered around the issue of exchanging values
between their components.
The overall balance of exchange values involved in the operation of a system can be analyzed for its state in terms of equilibrium (beneﬁcial for all agents) or
disequilibrium (beneﬁcial to a particular agent or group of agents, or beneﬁcial to nobody).
It is usually attributed to George Caspar Homans the initial development of the exchange values approach to social organizations [19, 20]. In connection to that, the
exchange values approach is sometimes criticized as too narrow in scope, on the basis of its supposedly inherent behavioristic limitations, due to Homans’ explicit
adoption of Burrhus Skinner’s behavioristic psychology as an ancillary explanatory theory of individual human behavior.
Nevertheless, the exchange values approach to the analysis of social interaction has nothing inherently behavioristic in it. Well before Homans introduced his ideas in
[19], Jean Piaget proposed a constructive, non-behavioristic, theory of social exchanges, where exchange values play a central role [30, 31].
Moreover, Piaget’s theory of exchange values goes much further than Homan’s theory, both in what concerns the scope of application of exchange values (going as far
as showing their role in the origination of laws, moral rules and organizational norms) and in what concerns the degree of formalization of the ideas.
The main contribution of the exchange values approach to social exchanges, in comparison to the classical, quantitative utility functions based approach, is the
introduction of the possibility of taking care of the subjective values, of qualitative nature, with which everyone judges the daily exchanges he has (good, bad, better
than, worst than, etc.), which usually cannot be faithfully represented quantitatively, due to the lack of neat objective conditions for their measurement.
In this paper, we build on our previous work regarding the application of Piaget’s approach to the analysis of interactions in multi-agent systems [34, 35, 14] and
cooperative environments [8, 10], to consider the way systems of exchange values can be taken as useful  tools for helping to solve problems concerning the
organization of multi-agent systems.
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 Also, we explain our understanding of the connection between Piaget’s and Homans’ approaches to exchange values, showing
the role that Homan’s theory can play in the broader analytical framework set up by Piaget.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we summarize the sociological basis of the work, as encompassed by Piaget’s theory of exchange values (Sect. 2.1), by
Homans’ theory of social behavior (Sect. 2.2), and by the way we think both theories ﬁt together (Sect. 2.3).
In Sect. 3, we present in an axiomatic way our notion of social organization: in Sect. 3.2 we state how social organizations are construed by social functions, social
roles, exchange values, and social rules. In Sect. 3.4, we express the dynamics of social organizations, in terms of regulation of exchanges of values, so that social
rules and social equilibrium can be connected to that dynamics. Section 3.5 introduces the notion of supervisors of social equilibrium.
In Sect. 4 we bring the main concrete contribution of the paper, namely, a general model of a supervisor of social equilibrium. Section 4.1 introduces our way of
representing qualitative exchange values by intervals of a numeric scale. Section 4.2 explains the use of such intervals to the modelling of social exchanges between
two agents, and Sect. 4.3 generalizes that modelling to a matrix-like notation capable of representing social exchanges between all agents of an organization. Section
4.4 shows how the exchange values equilibration problem of an organization can be solved by a qualitative interval Markov Decision Process [37], which uses the
interval representation for qualitative values introduced earlier.
Section 5 brings the analyzes of the model: a theoretical analysis (Sect. 5.1), regarding the reachability of the equilibrium state, considering the case in which all
agents follow the recommendations of the equilibrium supervisor; and a comparative analysis (Sect. 5.2) of simulations of (unsupervised and supervised) exchanges
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processes, considering different degrees of obedience to the supervisor. Section 6 is the Conclusion.
 
2 Sociological Bases
2.1 Piaget’s Theory of Exchange Values
As a cognitive psychologist, Piaget gave much less attention in his work to social and affective aspects of human behavior, than to its cognitive aspects. Nevertheless,
he had the opportunity to express in various places his ideas about those subjects (e.g., in [30, 31]).
2.1.1 Interactions as Social Exchanges
In what concerns human society, Piaget adopts a relational approach, such that the structure of a society is deﬁned as a relational structure where the relationships
among the individuals are established by social exchanges among them. Thus, interactions are understood as exchanges of services among individuals, involving not
only the realization of services by some individuals on behalf of others, but also the valuation of such services, from various points of view, by every individual involved
in them.
A service performed by an individual, however, is not a simple action or interference on the action of somebody else. To be counted as a service, an action performed
by an individual has be to understood by all  individuals involved in the action as an intentional action, directed toward some other individual, thus allowing its
evaluation as beneﬁcial or prejudicial to the latter. The evaluation of a service by an individual (either the server of the service or its client) is done on the basis of a
scale of so-called exchange values,which are of a qualitative nature, since such values express subjective evaluations
2
.
2.1.2 Exchange Values and Social Equilibrium
Exchange values give rise to a qualitative economy of social exchanges, where individuals acquire credits for services they have performed, and debits to others for
services the others have performed to them. The balances of exchange values allow individuals to observe the state of equilibrium of the social exchanges (even
between just two individuals) and to react according to such state (e.g., trying to enforce equilibrium, to overcome high debts, to keep their status as privileged
beneﬁciaries of the exchanges etc.).
Qualitative exchange values encompass economic values as a particular kind of (quantitative) values, and are seen as the cornerstones of social rules. Social rulesof
the many different varieties (formal or informal; moral, economical or juridical, including organizational norms) can often be understood as means put to operate in an
effort to guarantee that the overall balance of exchange values are kept in certain equilibrated (or disequilibrated, i.e., favorable to some individuals or groups of
individuals) states, so individuals are kept motivated (or, enforced) to continue their participation in those exchanges.
A crucial aspect for the right understanding of Pi-aget’s approach is the clear differentiation between the notions of social equilibrium and social order (social stability).
By social equilibrium it should be understood a kind of equality, or equity, in the distribution of exchange values among the agents participating in the exchange. By
social order, or social stability, it should be understood the temporal continuity of the established set of social exchanges. The two concepts are orthogonal, in the
sense that any stable or unstable exchange can be either in equilibrium or in disequilibrium, and any equilibrated or disequilibrated exchange can be either stable or
unstable. On the other hand, they are not independent, in the sense that each may impact the other
3
.
The main technical contribution of this paper is the concept of an equilibrium supervisor, a system component (possibly an agent) that, at each moment, is able to
recommend that particular exchanges among agents be performed so that a subset of the agents of the system (possibly, the whole set of agents) be kept in
equilibrium (or, disequilibrium). That is, so that all agents in that set beneﬁt from the exchanges in equal (or, differentiated) terms. In other words, equilibrium
supervisors embody social rules designed to keep a set of agents in certain (equilibrated or disequilibrated) states of exchange values.
2.1.3 Material and Virtual Exchange Values
Social  exchanges are classiﬁed by Piaget into two broad categories: immediateexchangesand deferredexchanges.  In immediate exchanges, individuals exchange
services in an immediate way, service for service, so that the evaluations of such services can be done immediately, as the services are being performed, allowing each
individual to immediately regulate the quality and quantity of the service it performs for the other (as when two people exchange material goods, negotiating the
quantities in which each good will participate in the exchange).
Two kinds of values are associated to such services, corresponding to the investment (cost) necessary to perform them, and to the satisfaction they may cause to the
client. Such values are called material exchange values.
Deferred exchanges involve a separation in time between the stages of an exchange of services, and give rise to so-called virtual exchange values, encompassing
credits and debits: after an individual performed a service for the other, the ﬁrst is entitled a credit for the service performed, and the other is entitled a debit for




Virtual values have the weakness that they tend to vanish as time passes: in a very distant future, one may not feel obliged to perform a service to somebody, in
return for a service he received before, precisely because that fact, having happened in a too distant past, may have lost its importance for the current situation.
Thus, besides serving the purpose of governing individual reactions to the state of the overall balance of exchange values, social rules also play the essential role of a
means to avoid the vanishing of virtual values, by associating such values to behaviors that aim their conservation, and that are to be mandatorily performed. Virtual
values have their most neat application to the regulation of exchanges between two individuals, but are easily extended to cover relations involving more individuals.
Social rules regulating the preservation of such values are either moral rules, historically created by the group, or private contracts spontaneously established between
the individuals involved in the exchanges.
2.1.5 The Structure of Social Exchanges
A social exchange between to agents,  and , is performed involving two types of stages, illustrated by the schemes in Fig. 1. In stages of type I , the agent 












is the value of ’s debt, the debt it acquired to  for its satisfaction with the service done by ;
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is the value of the credit that  acquires from  for having realized the service for . Investment values are always negative, while the other values may be either
positive or negative.





































are the virtual values. The order in which the exchange stages
may occur is not necessarily I II .
Figure 1: Stages of social exchanges.
Piaget’s modelling of social exchanges has an algebraic ﬂavor, aiming at the formalization of algebraic laws for the operations involved in those exchanges, laws that




= sI)  (sI = tI )  (tI = vI )
Rule II : (vII = tII )  (tII = rII )  (rII = sII )







Rule I states the conditions for the internal equilibrium of stage I , implying that the investment made by  in the performance of the service for  equals the
credit that  assigns to , that is
Rule I  .rI = vI
Rule II states the conditions for the internal equilibrium of stage II , implying that the credit charged by  on  equals the satisfaction  gets from the return
service performed by ,thatis







Rule I II states the conditions for the external equilibrium between the two stages, I and II , implying that the initial investment made by  equals the ﬁnal
satisfaction it gets from the interaction with , that is
Rule I II  . rI = sII
The equilibrium rules play a central role in Piaget’s explication of the dynamics of the social organization and in the identiﬁcation of situations of disequilibrium
(including several kinds of social crises).
The development of certain moral rules, for instance, is associated to the equilibrium rules, for such moral rules are developed precisely for the sake of guaranteeing
the validity of the equilibrium rules, through the enforcement of certain behaviors that can compensate behaviors which are prone to produce (or, that may have
produced) a situation of disequilibrium.
The main role of the equilibrium supervisor introduced in this paper is precisely that of indicating what behaviors should be performed at each moment, by the agents,
so as to compensate extant deviations from the state of equilibrium of exchange values.
2.2 Homans’ Theory of Elementary Social Behaviors
Homans approached the subject of social exchanges (that he called elementary social behaviors) from a different point of view [20]: he was interested in explaining
why each agent behave the way he does, in such exchanges. Being a sociologist, Homans borrowed from Skinner the theory of operant conditioning, as a means to
explain why men continue to behave in certain ways (or, change behaviors), in certain situations.
Homans looked at the exchanges values when he looked for a sufficient stimulus for continued (or, discontinued) social behavior, and found it in the concept of proﬁt,
deﬁned as proﬁt= beneﬁt cost, where beneﬁt and cost are deﬁned almost exactly as in Piaget’s theory. Proﬁt, in this qualitative sense, is seen as the element that
can play the role of stimulus: bigger proﬁt means stronger stimulus to continue the current behavior, while smaller proﬁt means stronger stimulus to discontinue the
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current behavior.
Of course, search for proﬁt maximization was known, to Homans, not to lead necessarily to the best overall results for the partners of an interaction, specially when
looked from the point of view of social equilibrium, as Pareto had shown much earlier
5
.So, Homans had to extend Skinner’s conceptions of human behavior with
notions that are essentially nonbehavioristic (such as the notion of personal integrity before a group[19]) in order to produce consistent explanations.
Homans’ proposal gave the starting point for the formalization we present below, where the process of socia control that regulates an interaction (which in Homans’
theory results from the combination of the various individual behaviors involved in the interaction) is reduced to a Markov Decision Problem [37], to be solved by a
central equilibrium supervisor.
2.3 The Role That Homans’ Theory May Have in Piaget’s Framework
The striking similarity between the basic concepts of the two theories, by Homans and Piaget, regarding the idea that a society is based on an organization where the
relationships between individuals are conceived as valued exchanges, puts the question about the possible ways the two theories can be made closer to each other.
From our point of view, the way the two theories can be combined is based on the following observations. On the one hand, in the theory of the psychologist Piaget,
the psychological aspects of social interactions were kept out of the formalization of social exchanges, to allow for a qualitative algebraic form. The price Piaget paid for
that is that the theory had to give up producing a description of the decision processes that the individuals adopt while interacting, that is, to give up explaining the
individuals’ behaviors.
On the other hand, in the theory of the sociologist Homans, the psychological aspect of social interactions was brought to the foreground, in order to produce a
description of the decision processes adopted by the interacting individuals, and an explanation of their behaviors. The behavioristic basis of the adopted psychological
explanation, however, forced two consequences. First, the exchange values that could be taken into account were restricted to those of a quantitative nature, so that
the notion of proﬁt could be introduced, as a measurable and comparable difference between beneﬁts and costs. Second, the psychological theory itself had to be
extended in non-behavioristic directions, in order to accommodate subjective phenomena not directly observable, but essential for the explanation of moral behaviors.
The very constructions of the two approaches, thus, already indicate the way they may be combined: Piaget’s theory can be used to formalize an explanation of social
exchanges where the agents are understood algebraically, on the basis of the operations they use to handle the exchange values, while Homans’ theory can be adapted
to deal with the piagetian algebra of qualitative values, in order to formalize the internal decision processes that agents follow when deciding on the keeping or
changing of their social behaviors.
In this paper, we present a ﬁrst step in that direction. We don’t show agents making decisions on the basis of their own idiosyncratic criteria, but we show a simpliﬁed
version of the problem, where all agents are assumed to uniformly follow the same set of criteria when deciding what exchanges to propose to another agent, but
where each agent is allowed to answer to that proposal in its own manner.
Halving the complexity of the problem in this way, we were able to perform the ﬁrst, provisory stage in the formalization of the proposed integration of the two
sociological theories that were taken as our bases of our work. The next step in the evolution of this synthesis, accounting for the agents’ individual decision making
with respect to exchange values, is brieﬂy considered in the Conclusion of the paper.
 
3 Social Organizations
In this section, we build on previous work on the dynamics of multi-agent organizations [4, 5, 6, 7, 3, 13] in order to coordinate the notions of organization and
exchange values, so that systems of exchange values can become useful tools for the organization of multiagent systems.
The central concept introduced here is that of dynamics of exchange values in social organizations.
3.1 The Notion of Social Organization
The notion of organization is not univocal. There are at least two main senses in which it is used, namely, a functional sense and a structural sense. In the functional
sense, organization is one of the functional in variants that characterize all forms of autonomous dynamic systems [28]. In the structural sense, the organization of an
autonomous dynamic system is the relational structure that allows the system’s components to interact with each other. In this paper, we use the term organization in
the latter, structural sense.
In its simplest form, the organization of a society have in order to perform such functions in an adequate way; social roles are the gluing elements of an organization;
-exchange values are the means by which the services that an agent performs are evaluated by the members of the society (including the agent itself and the other
agents involved in the exchange), so S, at a given time t, is conceived as a structure OtS = that a resulting balance of exchange values can be (AtS) where Ais the set
of agents of the society at tS, EtS used by social rules (see below) to compensate behaviors that deviate the society from the desired time t,and EtS is the set of social
exchanges tS tSA  A that are happening at that time
6
. In the following, we will only consider the static (synchronic) case, where the organization of a society is not
changing while the society is functioning. So, we will let implicit the time kind of balance (equilibrated, disequilibrated);
-social rulesare the means by which agents (given the social functions that are to be performed in the society, and the way the social roles were as index t. Also, since
we will consider one single society, we will let implicit the index S. signed to the agents) are obliged to behave in certain ways, and forbidden to behave in some other
ways.
3.2 Social Functions, Social Roles, Exchange Values, and Social Rules
Implicit in the structural conception of organization is, thus, a dynamical notion of social equilibrium(or, disequilibrium), which – in this paper – we restrict to the notion
of equilibrium (or, disequilibrium) ofsocial exchanges, as deﬁned by Piaget.
3.3 Deﬁnition of Social Organization
For the purposes of this paper, the notion of social organization can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1 The organization of a society is a structure O =(A, F, Ro,E,BV, Ru) where:A is the set of agents; F is the set of services (functions) that agents, and sets of
agents,should provide for each other; Ro is the set of social roles that agents may be assigned to; E is the set of social exchanges that agents may perform between
them; BV isthe set of balances of exchange values that supports the various ways agents may evaluate social exchanges; Ru isthe set of social rules that regulate the
agents’ behaviors.
7
To the main elements of the organization of a society, given in the deﬁnition above, a few more complementary elements should be added, so that the dynamics of the
organization can be explained:
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-the set IBeh of all possible individual behaviorsof all agents of the society, so that to each agent corresponds the set of individual behaviors that it is capable of
realizing, given by IB : A  IBeh; Societies with the simple form deﬁned above should have a big problem to keep their existence in time: the only permanent element
they have are the agents, since exchanges are usually ﬁnite, and vanish suddenly. Agents, in such situations, are thus allowed to interact with any other agents in the
society, at any time, as they are pleased, or simply not to interact at all. Organization, in such societies, is no more than a set of momentary exchanges. There is no
way organization can become a structural invariant of the society, in a society with such a simple form.
Many other permanent elements are required, in the organization of a society, if the society is to be able to keep its organization reasonably stable during a certain
period. We identify four main notions allowing for such invariant organization, namely, social functions, social roles, exchange values,and social rules:
-social functions are the services that agents (or, sets of agents), perform for other agents (or, sets of agents) in the society, and that justify the very existence of the
society: agents that are selfsufficient need not live in societies; only agents that have the need that others perform certain services for them care to live together with
others;
-social rolesare the relational elements that establish the links between the agents, the social functions they perform, and the behavior they should -the way the set E
of all possible social exchanges are related to the subset of agents that are capable of realizing them together, given by Cap : (A)  E;
-the way each social function is implemented by a set of agents in the form of a social exchange, given by I : F (A) E;
-the way each social role determines the individual behavior of the agent to which it is assigned, regarding the performance of a social function, given by the function P
: F Ro IBeh;
-the way each agent evaluates the performance of an exchange, given by the function Ev : E A  BV
-the way each social rule determines the permitted, obligatory and forbidden behaviors of agents in a social exchange, according to the balance of exchange values
assigned to the social exchange, regarding the performance of a social function, given by Ru : F A E (IBeh {p, o, f}).
The detailed exploration of the connections among the main and complementary elements of a social organization, as deﬁned above, are out of the scope of this paper.
We concentrate just on the connections that allow the understanding of our notion of dynamics of exchange values, leading to the concept of exchange value-based
social control, and its provisory centralized form, the supervisor of social equilibrium.
3.4 The Dynamics of Exchange Values
Although Piaget, in his sociological works, did not develop his notion of dynamics of an organization, both in his works on the Epistemology of Biology [28] and in his
psychological works on the equilibration of cognitive structures [29], that notion is well exposed. We summarize here that piagetian cybernetics,concentrating just in
the concepts that directly apply to our problem.
In any dynamical system where a notion of equilibrium can be deﬁned, two related concepts immediately apply, namely, the concepts of deviation and compensation.
Deviation is any action that may happen in a system and lead it to disequilibrium, that is, away from equilibrium. Compensation is any action that may happen in a
system, when it is in disequilibrium, and lead it back to equilibrium.
Regulation  is  the  process  of  determining  which  compensation  should  be  performed,  at  a  given  moment,  to  compensate  a  deviation,  when  the  system is  in
disequilibrium. In Homan’s terms [19], Piaget’s process of regulation is a social control process that aims to keep the society stable in a state of equilibrium.
Piaget applies such ideas both to the synchronic regulation of a system’s functioning (where the structure of the system is kept essentially unchanged) and to the
diachronic regulation of the development of the system’s structural organization, when the system is in a process of development. To the ﬁrst, he assigned the name
minor equilibration,  while  the latter  he called major equilibration.  In our case,  we focus on the synchronic  functioning of  a social  system, so that  only minor
equilibrations will be considered. We consider social systems where the interactions are seen as exchanges of services, and whose equilibrium is deﬁned on the basis of
balances of values associated to such exchanges. In such systems, deviations are actions (performances of services) whose evaluations lead the system to a state
where the balances of exchange values are such that at least one of the equilibrium rules I ,II and I II is not satisﬁed. A compensation is a performance of a
service that may lead the system back to a state where the balances of exchange values are such that those rules are satisﬁed.
Social  rulesspecify a mechanism of social  control  by stipulating that,  for each state of  disequilibrium, the kind of  action that should be performed in order to
re-establish the equilibrium of the system. Two kinds of such actions are possible: punishment and reciprocation. Punishment is an action by which an individual suffers
some lost in order to be reinforced towards not repeating the deviation action again.
Reciprocation is an action by which an individual is forced to perform a service for the other, in order to compensate him for some service the latter had previously
performed for him. Reciprocation is the fundamental operation of compensation, in Piaget’s model of regulation of social exchanges.
Of course, everything that has been said here in connection to social control processes that aim to stabilize the society or organization in a state of equilibrium, also
applies to social control processes that aim to keep the society or organization stable in a state of disequilibrium
8
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3.5 Supervisors of Social Equilibrium
In general, such exchange values-based mechanism of social controlmay be put to operate in two main ways. On the one hand, social rules may be enforced by
authorities, which have the capacity to push the agents of the society to follow such rules.
On the other hand, social rules may be internalized by the agents, so that agents follow such rules because they are incorporated into the agents’ behaviors.
Typical of the social rules enforced by authorities are the juridicalrules of a society (laws, statutes, organizational norms), dealing with rights and duties. Typical of the
internalized rules are the moral rules, dealing with permissions and obligations.
In the following, as a preparatory step to a future study of decentralized social control mechanisms based on social rules internalized in agents, we introduce a
centralized version of such mechanism. We consider the notion of supervisor of social equilibrium, a component of the society (possibly an agent) that is able to
determine, at each time, the set of compensation actions that may be performed in order to bring the social system back to the equilibrium (or, disequilibrium),
regarding the balances of exchange values, and that may recommend some of such actions to the agents of the system, in order to get that equilibrium (or,
disequilibrium).
Obviously, supervisors of social equilibrium do not implement moral rules, because moral rules, in the sense deﬁned above, can only be implemented inside the agents
themselves, not in a component of the society that is external to them.
So, supervisors of social equilibrium implement juridical rules (laws, norms). However, they do so in a way that they are not law enforcers, because we don’t require
that agents follow the recommendations: agents are allowed to autonomously decide if they are to follow, or not, any given recommendation.
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4 A Model Supervisor of Social Equilibrium
In  this  section,  we introduce a  formal  model  for  a  supervisor  of  social  equilibrium, which is  able  to  implement  a  regulation process  for  the equilibration (or,
disequilibration) of exchange values.
The regulation process is embedded in the equilibrium supervisor in the form of a recommendation policy, which determines for each kind of exchange values state an
appropriate compensation action.
However, we don’t consider here the connection between the recommendation policy that implements the regulation process, and the expression of such regulation
process in the form of juridical rules. That is, everything works in the model as if the juridical rules were pre-compiled into its recommendation policy, by way of the
reward function of the Markov Decision Process solved by the equilibrium supervisor.
Further work is necessary on this compilation process both to understand the connection between the language of juridical laws and its translation in terms of
exchange values, and to allow for a dynamic compilation process, capable of supporting dynamic changes in juridical laws, in order to model organizations supporting
evolutive juridical systems.
4.1 Using Interval Mathematics for Representing Social Values
Interval Mathematicsis a mathematical theory introduced in the 1960’s by Moore [26] that aims at the automatic and rigorous control of the errors that arise in
numerical computations. Any real number x  Ris represented by a real interval X =[x1,x2], with x1,x2 R, such that x1 x  x2. x1and x2denote, respectively, the
left and right endpoints of a real interval X. The set of real intervals is denoted by IR.
The arithmetical operations  IR{+,,÷} are deﬁned on IRas X  IRY = {xy | x  X,y  Y}9, and they can be explicitly calculated by [27]:
Addition: X + Y =[x1+ y1,x2+ y2]
Subtraction: X Y =[x1y2,x2y1]
Product: X Y = [min 	,max 	],
with 	 = {x1y1,x1y2,x2y1,x2y2}






















The interval arithmetic operations satisfy the monotonic inclusion property, for all X,X,Y,Y
 






. This property plays an important role in the
usage of Interval Mathematics to compute with real numbers that are uncertain for some reason (e.g., if they are obtained by a measuring instrument with limited
resolution) or that are not exactly representable in a ﬂoating point system (e.g, the numbers ,0.1, 
3
).
A machine interval has ﬂoating point numbers as endpoints and outward roundings are used to guarantee that the resulting output interval of any interval computation
process contains the actual result [17]. Besides that, the range of the output interval is the indicative of the maximum error that may have occurred in the whole
process.
Interval Mathematics has also been applied to represent other kinds of uncertainty rather than numerical uncertainty [16], with applications in Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
Soft Computing etc.
In this paper, intervals are used to capture the qualitative nature of Piaget’s concept of scale of exchange values[31]. The chosen representation is a compromise
between  a  purely  qualitative  and  a  purely  quantitative  representation.  It  makes  the  representation  mathematically  operational,  and  the  decision  process
computationally viable, without being unfaithful to Piaget’s approach.
Let IRL = {[x1,x2] |L  x1 x2 L} be the set of real intervals bounded by L R(L> 0) and let IRL =(IRL, +, ,, )bea scale of interval exchange values, where:
-+ : IRL IRL IRL is the L-bounded addition operation deﬁned by
X + Y = [max{x1+ y1, L}, min{x2+ y2,L}].






is the mid point of X. The set of null values is denoted by . 0 = [0, 0] is the absolute null
value.
-A quasi-symmetric value of X IRL is any interval X
 
IRL such that X + X
 
. The set of quasi-symmetric values of X is denoted by X.
- is the qualitative equivalence relation deﬁned by X Y Y 
 
Y: X + Y 
 
.
  X is said to be the least quasi-symmetric value of X if whenever there exists S  X it holds that d( X)  d(S), where d(X)= x2x1is the diameter of X. For all X
IRL, it follows that:
Proposition 1 (i)
X = {[mid(X)k, mid(X)+k] |k Rk 0};(ii)
X = [mid(X),mid(X)].
Proof. It holds that mid(X +[(mid(X)+ x1x22kx2x1+2kk), (mid(X) k)]) = mid 
2
, = 20. Consider S  = mid(X).









= 0, which is a
contradiction. It follows that any quasi-symmetric value of X is of the form [(mid(X)+ k), (mid(X) k)] and, when k =0, X =[mid(X), mid(X)] is obtained.
In practical applications, due to the rounding errors that arise in any numerical computation, it is usually not possible to verify wether or not a computed interval is
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precisely the absolute null value 0 [1, 17, 18, 27]. Then, we shall introduce the concept of absolute-null value0 =[, +], with  R( 0) being a given tolerance.
In this case, an -null value is any X IRL such that mid(X)  0. The set of -null values is denoted by . The related set of -quasi-symmetric values for an interval value
X IRL is denoted by
X, and, from Prop. 1, it follows that the least -quasi-symmetric value is given by
X =[(mid(X)+ ), (mid(X) )]. (1)
The qualitative equivalence relation(module ) is then deﬁned by X  Y Y 
 
Y : X + Y 
 
.
4.2 The Modelling of Social Exchanges
Let T be a set of discrete instants of time. Let  and  be any two agents. A qualitative interval exchange-value system for modelling the exchanges from  to  is a


















































: T IRL (3)
are partial functions, called exchange-value functions, that evaluate, at each time instant t  T , the investment, satisfaction, debt and credit values10,re-spectively,
















































For the exchange-value functions given in (2) and (3), at a given time instant t, the following constraints must be satisﬁed for every pair of agents  and :













= r = s 
t 
= , (5)















=  denotes that the agent , at time t,did not charge the credit for a service previously done for the agent , and, therefore, all the other corresponding exchange
values in the stage II resulted undeﬁned.
The implication (6) means that, according to the structure of social exchanges (Fig. 1), it is not possible for an agent  to perform a service for  and, at the same time



















































A social exchange process between two agents and  of a multi-agent system, occurring during the time instants T = t1,...,tn, is any ﬁnite sequence of such





. Each element of this sequence is called a stage of the exchange process, which may be a stage of type I or type II.


















A social exchange process between a pair of agents  and  is said to be in equilibrium(with tolerance   0) if TT g

 
  and g

 
 . The material equilibrium is
achieved when TT m

 




4.3 Modelling Social Exchanges Involving Multiple Agents
In this section, a matrix-like notation is introduced to make possible the generalization of the results concerning the social exchanges between two agents, presented
in Sect. 4.2, for the case of an organization composed by m agents. An mm interval -matrix[xij ]is deﬁned as the interval m  m matrix [xij ] where xij = 
whenever i = j,that is.

















A2  2 -matrix is denoted schematically by an where, for k = r,s,t,v.
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For two interval mm-matrices X =[xij ]
 
and Y =[yij ], we deﬁne:
-The additionoperation: X + Y =[xij + yij ].
-Any -matrix [nij ]
 
such that nij   is an -null-matrix. The set of such -matrices is denoted by N.
-The qualitative equivalence relation(module ): X  Y  (i = j) xij  yij .
In a multi-agent system composed by m agents, the exchange values determined by the functions deﬁned in (2) and (3) can be represented by the eight mm#T










= . The exchange balance of stages of type II, denoted by b
T 
, is deﬁned analogously. The general exchange balance is






{,} I{,} II{,} 
.
The material results m and m of a social exchange process that happens between agents  and , during the interval T, according to the points of view of  and ,
















I T TTT m

 







































































I IIII are m  m interval -matrices. For a time sequence T = t1,...,tn, the four m m matrices of globalinvestment, satisfaction, debt and credit in T










t=t1t=t1 for K = R,S,T,V.














Analogously, the exchange balance of stages of type II is represented as a tuple B
T 








































Thus, a multi-agent system is said to be in equilibrium if GT  N.
It is in material equilibrium when MT  N.
If a social exchange process between any pair of agents  and , which occurred in T, is not in material equilibrium according ’s point of view, that is, m
T 
  , then




, given in (1), is said to be the compensation value from ’s point of view. The compensation value for m
T 
  is the  interval
[0,0]. A compensation-matrix for a -matrix of material results M
T 
is the -matrix M
 













and the go-backward3–go-forward+2 respectively, resulting in the following state transitions, with n i< 1 and 1 <j n.
The equilibrium supervisor has to ﬁnd, for each state [E
i
], the action that shall achieve the terminal state or, at least, another state from where the terminal state can
be achieved, with the least number of steps and least ﬁnal valueuncertainty
12
. We observe that the choice of such actions are also regulated by the rules of the social
exchanges, and, therefore, there are some state transitions that are not allowed.
Based on a optimal policy, the equilibrium supervisor may be asked to recommend that the agents act optimally. An optimal exchange recommendation consists of a
function that gives, for each actual material result (represented by a state of the model), a partially deﬁned exchange stage that shall restore or establish the material
equilibrium or, at least, give conditions that it be achieved in a least number of steps with least value uncertainty. This partial deﬁnition shall be completed by the
analysis of the virtual results, which allows the speciﬁcation of which particulary types of exchange stages (I or II) should be considered.
Although the interacting agents acknowledge the optimal recommendations from the equilibrium supervisor, they are autonomous in the sense that they may not
follow  the  recommendations  exactly.  The  agents  may  have  different  personalities,  interests,  needs  etc.,  which  may  lead  them  not  to  always  follow  the
recommendations. This means that there is a probability that the system achieves another state different from the suggested by the supervisor and, therefore, there
may be a great deal of uncertainty about the effects of the agents actions.





is the equilibrium supervisor accuracy and  R(0 <n) is the admissible tolerance. On the other hand, in this paper, we assume that there is never any
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uncertainty about the current state of the system, that is, the equilibrium supervisor always has access to the current conﬁguration of exchange values and has
complete and perfect abilities to evaluate the current material balance.
Deﬁnition 2 AQualitative Interval Markov Decision Process (QI–MDP),for keeping in equilibrium the social exchanges in a multi-agent systems of magents, is a tuple E,
A, F, R
L,n
,where this model, the next state and the expected reward depend only on the previous state and the action taken, satisfying the so-called Markovproperty.
4.4.2 The Optimal Policy and the Reward Function
The reward function plays an important role when the equilibrium supervisor is choosing the action that will generate a recommendation of agents interaction, in each
state. The supervisor aims to maximize the utility of sequences of actions, evaluated according to the reward function, thus trying to bring the system back to
equilibrium (or keep it there) with the least possible number of state transitions.
A sample reward function R :(E A)  Rthat conforms to the idea of supporting a recommendation function that is able to direct pairs of agents into social equilibrium
is partially sketched in Table 3, using the notation given in (13). This particular sample function illustrates various requirements that should be satisﬁed by any reward
function of the model.




), then the best action to be chosen is the compensation-compensationaction (C, C)
 
, which results












. Any other choice should make the agents either take a long way to the equilibrium or get away from it.




), then a compensation-compensation action (C, C)
 
would generate a recommendation of agent exchanges of
satisfaction-satisfactiontype, which is impossible according to the model of social interactions [33], since it is impossible for an agent to get a satisfaction value from no
service at all. The reward function R should state that (C,C)
 
is a very bad action to be chosen in such situation.
Any optimal policy : E  A solving the social equilibrium problem should satisfy the set of requirements expressed by the schema partially sketched in Table 4 (for a
pair of agents). Notice that it is a non deterministic policy.
The optimal value recommendation associated to an optimal policy is
 
a -matrix operator 	 that gives, for each state E
i 













and   r,A
j 
, where (r ,W) means the performance,  by the agent , of a service with investment value W< 0, and (s,W) means ’s
satisfaction with interval value W
 
. The optimal value recommendation 	 , corresponding to the the optimal policy shown in Table 4, is partially sketched in Table 5.
Finally, the equilibrium supervisor has to decide which types of exchange stages (I or II) should be recommended. This is done by the analysis of the virtual results
from the points of view of each pair of agents  (given in (10)) and  (given in (11)):
-If v > 0, then  is able to charge  the credit for services previously done. Thus, an exchange stage of type II should be recommended.
-If v > 0, then it is the case that the agent  can charge  the credit for services previously done, indicating that an exchange stage of type II should then be
recommended.
-If v  0, then the agent  does not have any credit to charge . Therefore, the service done by  must be spontaneous. In this case, an exchange stage of type I
should then be recommended.
-If v  0, then the agent  does not have any credit to charge , resulting that an exchange stage of type I should then be chosen.
Table 6 shows the criteria used by the equilibrium supervisor to reason about the possible stagerecommendations, based on virtual results, according to the discussion
presented in the paragraph above. Observe that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive. The ﬁnal decision of which type of exchange stage shall be executed is
let to the agents to decide.






v > 0 II T1
v > 0 II T2
v  0 I T3
v  0 I T4
The stage effects of the recommendations (Table 6) are sketched in the simpliﬁed state transition diagram shown in Fig. 2. The dot lines represent alternative paths to
the equilibrium state that were not considered as optimal recommendations since they are considered impossible according to the structure of the exchange stages.
The symbol  of the -matrices was omitted.
 
5 Analysis of the Model
For the analysis of the model, we consider a multiagent organization whose agents are classiﬁed by the degree in which they follow the recommendations given by the
equilibrium supervisor. The obedient agent always follows the recommendations; the disobedient agent may not follow the recommendations.
The symbol  in the notation of the -matrices was omitted.
Consider a multi-agent system composed by just where 
L 
= h, with h> 1. If the system achieves two obedient agents  and  and use the notation the equilibrium in











terial results, at step , of a social exchange
process performed by the agents  and . For a given tolerance 0 <<n = 
L 
, where n is the equilibrium supervisor accuracy, the following results hold:
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0 E1,then   thesystemachievestheequilibriuminonestepifand n   ’s material result is analogous. The proof of ()is almost
straightforward. 
Proposition 3 (i)Ifm
0Ei,with1 <i n,then  itispossibletogetm
 
E0inatmost =2 steps   L therefore, 1 <  3, since  The proof for = Proof.() Considering that




), then, for ’s material result, it holds that(m
0
n 
, and the optimal recommendation 
)  L 
atmost =2 stepsifandonlyif1 <n   3.
Proof. (i)() Considering that (i1) 
L 
 n (Table 5, R11) is based on the optimal action.
Table 5: Partial schema of the optimal value recommendation 	









(Cj < 0,Ci > 0) ((r ,Cj ),(s,Ci))
R2
(Ei,Ej )1n (Ci < 0,Cj < 0)
((r ,Ci),(s,Cj )) or
((r,Cj ),(s ,Ci))
R3R4
(E0,Ej )1n (0,Cj < 0) ((r,Cj ),(s ,0)) R5
(Ej ,E0)1n (Cj < 0,0) ((r ,Cj ),(s,0)) R6










(E1,Ej )1n (F1+1> 0,Cj < 0) ((r,Cj ),(s ,F1+1)) R9
(E1,Ei)ni<1 (B11< 0,Ci > 0) ((r ,B11),(s,Ci)) R10
(E1,E1) (F1+1> 0,B11< 0) ((r,B11),(s
,F1+1))
R11
(E1,E1) (B11< 0,F1+1> 0) ((r ,B11),
(s,F1+1))
R12
(Ei,E1)ni<1 (Ci > 0,B11< 0) ((r,B11),(s ,Ci)) R13
(E1,E0) (F1+1> 0,B01< 0) ((r,B01),(s
,F1+1))
R14






1< 0) or (Bj 1<
0,Fi +(i+1)> 0)
((r,Bj 1),(s ,Fi
+(i+1)) or ((r ,Bj
1),(s,Fi +(i+1))
R16R17
Therefore, it holds that m
1 E1

. From Prop. 2, it  follows that with one more step we can get the desired result. The proofs of (i)() and (ii) are analogous. The








2i+1L   mid m
0
+,thenm
1 E0 2n  2n .  E1(or E
1
)
From Prop. 3, it follows that an individual transition from a material result that belongs to a class E
i 
, with 1 <i  nor n  i< 1, to the equilibrium can be done in at














), with 1 <i  n and n  j<






















, and, in this case, it will not be possible to get the











). Thus, the overall process takes three steps.




), with n  i,j < 1, since two simultaneous positive compensation
actions (that would require a recommendation of satisfaction values for the two agents without
The symbol  in the notation of the -matrices was omitted.
any service at all) are not allowed. In this case, the optimal recommendation (Table 5) leads the agents to get the material equilibrium in at most four steps, by one of
the following transitions.
5.2 Simulation Results
Simulations  of  supervised  social  exchange  processes  were  developed  in  the  Python  programming  language,  generating  two  types  of  reports:  tables  with  the
conﬁgurations of exchange values and material results at each time t  T =0,...,1000, and graphics showing the trajectory of the mid points of the material results of
the exchanges between two agents of a (simulated) system. The material and virtual values that agents could use at each exchange stage were set to vary in the
range 100 ...+ 100. A tolerance of [,]=[25,25] was adopted for the deﬁnition of the equilibrium point.
First, we considered simulations of social exchanges processes in organizations where the supervisor was inactive, Fig. 3, having exchange values bound to
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Figure 2: Effects of stage and optimal value recommendations
L = 2400). In those simulations, the social exchanges
were totally random along all the time interval T .
Then we awaked up the supervisor and let it make recommendations, which the agents followed or not, according to their degree of obedience to the supervi
sor. In successive experiments, we increased the percentage of agent obedience to the supervisor, generating ﬁve different simulations: obedience during 1% of the
time (Fig.4, exchange values bound to L = 1400), obedience during 25% of the time (Fig. 5, exchange values
Time bound to L = 700), obedience during 50% of the time (Fig. 6, exchange values bound to L = 350), obedience during 75% of the time (Fig. 7, exchange values
Figure 4: Agent obedience in 1
% 
of the time to bound L = 185) and obedience during 100% of the time (Fig. 8, exchange values bound to L = 105). In the
unsupervised exchange processes shown in Fig. 3, agents  and  present behaviors such that 
Mid Point of Material Results
proﬁted from the interaction much more than ,which was forced to keep its material results at a negative level for the most part of the experiment. Considering the
given tolerance, one ﬁnds that the system starts in equilibrium, but was unable to keep it.
Figure 4 shows a 1% supervised exchange processes.
 
enough to make the two agents alternate their kinds of behaviors during the exchanges, thus avoiding that
 
The ﬁgure shows that just such level of supervision is one of them proﬁts from the interaction at the expense of the other. Also, the system was able to achieve the
equilibrium in various opportunities (e.g., at t = 196 and at t = 893), but was kept yet in disequilibrium
Figure 3: Unsupervised social exchange process almost all of the time.
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 Figure 5: Agent obedience in 25% of the time
Figure 7: Agent obedience in 75% of the time
 
 
Figure 6: Agent obedience in 50% of the time
Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 shows the increasing effect of the supervisor recommendations, according the increasing level of the agents’ obedience to it. In particular, one
can see that the range of deviations of the material results from the equilibrium was progressively reduced as the agents progressively adhered to the supervisor’s
recommendations.
The simple simulations that we produced seem to conﬁrm well the theoretical predictions that we could derive from the supervisor model in section 5.1.
 
6 Conclusion
This paper introduced the QI–MDP version of the Markov Decision Process. The combination of interval-based modelling and qualitative approach to the comparison of
values of the model made it well suited for solving the problem of keeping social exchanges in equilibrium.
From the point of view of Piaget’s theory of social Figure 8: Agent obedience in 100% of the time interactions, it means a sound way of making practical use of the
INRC group of social exchanges that structure the social interactions and deﬁnes its equilibrium problem [9, 10].
The QI–MDP model is general enough to be applied to other problems, besides the problem of keeping social interactions in equilibrium. It can be adapted to model
situations in which the social interactions should be kept stable, but in disequilibrium. This can be done by choosing a non null terminal state for the supervisor.
The model can also be applied to equilibrium problems of other kinds of systems, besides systems of social exchanges, if such systems have one single terminal
(equilibrated, disequilibrated) state.
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Regarding the notion of socialcontrolintroduced in [23], and explored in [12] in connection to multiagent systems, the social rules concerned with exchange values
introduce the notion of exchangevaluesbasedsocialcontrol, ﬁrst analyzed in [19]. Thus, the present paper can be seen as a preliminary step in the computational
formalization of such notion.
Immediate future work will be concerned with the case of an equilibrium supervisor that is not able to determine the material balance of social exchange processes
with complete reliability (i.e., it is not allowed to know all the exchange values of the two agents). In this case, a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP)
shall be considered (see, p.ex., [15]), since the equilibrium supervisor shall be able to make external observations (also probabilistic) to help him to decide about the
recommendations.
Further future works will  deal with (i) the internalization of the model decision process introduced in the paper, in each agent of the organization, so that the
mechanism of exchange values-based social control that it supports can be performed in a decentralized way, and (ii) further exploration of the role of exchange values
in dependence-based agent interactions.
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Values have been extensively used in the MAS area, through value-based and market-oriented decision, and value-based social theory, see e.g., [2, 36, 25]. The
merits and interest in using Piaget’s notion of exchange values is discussed in [34, 35], showing its complementarity to the dependence theory approach.
2
A scale of exchange values is a set of qualitative, ordinal values, which can be compared for their magnitudes (less than, equal, greater than), but cannot be
algebraically operated in an unrestricted way, as fully quantitative values can. E.g., the values can be added or subtracted: if a<b and a<c then a + c. However, the
differences between values cannot be compared: if a and c it is not possible to decide which of b  a cor b a= d c,orelse b a>d c,istrue.
3
But this mutual dependence was not fully exploited by Piaget, who concentrated on stable (“static”) societies.
4
The term virtualvaluerefers precisely to the fact that they represent services that are yet to be performed, in the future.
5
Homans and Piaget were both simpathetic readers of Pareto, see [22] and [30].
6
We follow [11] in considering the dependence relations as one of the main reasons for the establishment of social exchanges.
7
We let undetermined the details of the sets in Def. 1, in order to have an abstractnotion of social organization, which may be instantiated in various ways, in various
applications.
8
See [12] for a discussion of the role of social control processes in artiﬁcial societies.
9
Whenever it can be understood from the context, we shall not use the notation IRto distinguish interval operations.
10
The values are undeﬁned if no service is done at all at a given moment t  T .
11
To extend this representation to interactionsbetweentwogroupsA andB ofagentsone should take into account the sum total of the interactions of every agent of A with
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